The Principle of Fairness: A Game Theoretic Model

Luciano Andreozzi
Additional contact information
Luciano Andreozzi: University of Trento

Chapter 19. in Power, Freedom, and Voting, 2008, pp 365-383 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The history of international agreements aimed at environmental protection offers a mix of successes and failures, with the latter being far more frequent than the former. The best known example is the Kyoto protocol: a treatise signed by over 160 countries to reduce emissions of gasses held responsible for green-house effect. This agreement is usually considered to be a half failure, mostly because of the decision of the United States not to ratify it (Pizer 2006: 26). Other international treatises faced similar problems. For example, the Helsinki treaty for the reduction of emissions responsible for acid rains, signed in 1985 by a group of European and American countries, failed to be ratified by United States and United Kingdom (Barrett 2005).

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Collective Action; Moral Intuition; Strategy Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-73382-9_19

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540733829

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_19

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().