Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances

Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa

Chapter 3. in Power, Freedom, and Voting, 2008, pp 39-55 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The study of the formation and dissolution of alliances of voters aiming to increase their voting power is relatively new. The present note is a sequel to our earlier paper on this subject (see Felsenthal and Machover 2002). Since the latter’s publication, we have obtained some new results which can be viewed also as a complement to some of the results obtained by Gelman (2003).

Keywords: Decision Rule; Coalition Structure; Vote Power; Winning Coalition; Direct Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_3

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