Pivotal Voting Theory: The 1993 Clinton Health Care Reform Proposal in the U.S. Congress

Joseph Godfrey and Bernard Grofman
Additional contact information
Joseph Godfrey: WinSet Group
Bernard Grofman: University of California

Chapter 8. in Power, Freedom, and Voting, 2008, pp 139-158 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Theories of lobbying differ considerably about which legislators are most likely to be lobbied by which types of interest groups. In particular, there is not agreement as to whether lobbyists will focus on those likely to be sympathetic to the interest group (their friends), or those likely to be unsympathetic to the interest group (their enemies).1 Plausible arguments can be made in each direction. One lobbies one’s friends to offer information that will help them draft legislation and fend off criticism, and to remind them of past obligations and future payoffs (carrots); one lobbies one’s enemies because they need to be exposed to arguments and facts countervailing their most likely position, and to alert them that this is an important vote that will be remembered and might cost them the opposition of an interest group in future re-election efforts (sticks).

Keywords: Median Voter; Health Care Reform; Lobbying Effort; Swing Voter; Banzhaf Index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-73382-9_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540733829

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().