In-Koo Cho on Hugo F. Sonnenschein

Inkoo Cho and David M. Kreps
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David M. Kreps: University of Chicago, Stanford University

Chapter 14 in Foundations in Microeconomic Theory, 2008, pp 295-339 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract While struggling as a third year graduate student to begin my thesis work in the spring of 1984, Hugo advised me to look into the possibility of refining sequential equilibrium by exploiting the implicit communication between the sender and the receiver. After working for a few additional months, I was able to produce an example in early July. I used it to explain to Hugo that the implicit communication can refine sequential equilibrium farther than David Kreps had proposed. At the end of the discussion, Hugo said “In-Koo, you have come a long way.” He asked me to polish the example so that he could send it to David.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Stable Equilibrium; Pure Strategy; Extensive Form; Equilibrium Outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-74057-5_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-74057-5_16

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