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Corporate Income Taxation and the Subsidiarity Principle

François Pouget () and Eloïse Stéclebout-Orseau ()
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François Pouget: University of Paris Dauphine EURIsCO
Eloïse Stéclebout-Orseau: European Central Bank

Chapter 16 in Subsidiarity and Economic Reform in Europe, 2008, pp 273-290 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract According to the political economy literature, the allocation of tasks between different levels of government should follow the basic principle of fiscal federalism (Musgrave 1959, Oates 1972). This principle also applies to “international unions” whereby some countries provide together certain public goods or policies. In particular, the assignment of responsibilities to the supranational level should reflect a trade-off between efficiency gains induced by delegation and the costs resulting from the implementation of a single policy between heterogeneous countries (Alesina et al. 2005 for a theoretical analysis; Alesina et al. 2005 for a more applied analysis). This theoretical framework is embodied in the European concept of subsidiarity since European governance is characterized by a complex system of overlapping jurisdictions whose design constantly requires improvements.

Keywords: Public Spending; Transfer Price; Multinational Firm; Corporate Income Taxation; Public Input (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-77264-4_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77264-4_16

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