Assessing Subsidiarity

Sjef Ederveen, George Gelauff () and Jacques Pelkmans ()
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George Gelauff: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Jacques Pelkmans: College of Europe

Chapter 2 in Subsidiarity and Economic Reform in Europe, 2008, pp 19-40 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In order to provide inputs for an assessment of subsidiarity in specific policy fields, this chapter reviews the main motives for decentralization and centralization. Several motives underscore decentralization, such as the ability to align policy closer to the preferences of regional constituents or the effect of policy competition to discipline governments. In contrast, centralization may be warranted in a policy field characterized by increasing returns to scale or it may be useful if thereby it could create commitment for economic reform. However centralization may also fail to be useful, for example when local jurisdictions attempt to extract funds from the budget of a higher level of government.

Keywords: Member State; Policy Competition; Policy Field; Policy Learning; Government Failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Assessing subsidiarity (2006)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77264-4_2

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