Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?

Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny
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Kevin M. Murphy: University of Chicago
Robert W. Vishny: Harvard University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2008, pp 213-218 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Economists from (1776) to (1981) agree that poor protection of property rights is bad for growth. But why is this problem so severe? Why do Peru (Hernando De Soto, 1989) and Equatorial Guinea (Robert Klitgaard, 1990) fail to grow at all when public and private rent-seeking make property insecure? In this paper, we explore two reasons why rent-seeking, meaning any redistributive activity that takes up resources, is so costly to growth.

Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? (1993)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_11

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