Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction

Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper G. Vries
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Casper G. Vries: Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2008, pp 331-336 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Why do politicians frequently “announce” that they have narrowed down a set of potential recipients of a “prize” to a slate of finalists? In general, does the slate of finalists comprise the “best” candidates, and does the best candidate always win? This paper provides answers to these questions. Our model of the political process is one of rent-seeking, which takes the (perhaps overly jaded) view that persons with power award political prizes on the basis of self-interest.

Date: 2008
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Related works:
Journal Article: Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction (1993)
Working Paper: Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction (1992)
Working Paper: RIGGING THE LOBBYING PROCESS: AN APPLICATION OF THE ALL- PAY AUCTION (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_18

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_18

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