Caps on Political Lobbying

Yeon-Koo Che and Ian L. Gale
Additional contact information
Ian L. Gale: Georgetown University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2008, pp 337-345 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The cost of political campaigns in the United States has risen substantially in recent years. For example, real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 (Steven D. Levitt, 1995). There are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful. First, increased spending means increased fund-raising, which may keep politicians from their legislative duties. Second, a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes, on the shaping of legislation, or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings. That is, the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail. Likewise, a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislater’s investigation. Third, a preception that campagign contributes purches influence may lead to incresed tolerance of corrupted in the private sector

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Caps on Political Lobbying (1998)
Working Paper: Caps on Political Lobbying (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_19

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540792475

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_19

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().