On the efficient organization of trials

Gordon Tullock

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2008, pp 361-378 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Since Aristotle, economists have realized that efficient functioning of the economy requires the existence of firm property rights. This is even true of socialists, although the property they have in mind is somewhat different. The theft of state property is, after all, one of the more severe (and, apparently, also one of the commoner) offenses in Russia. The fulfillment of a contract and the enforcement of various rules which prevent people from inflicting negative externalities on each other are also part of orthodox economics. All of this assumes, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, that there is some kind of enforcement mechanism which will see to it that the rules are carried out.

Date: 2008
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Journal Article: ON THE EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION OF TRIALS (1975)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_21

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