Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game

Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino ()
Additional contact information
Amy Farmer: University of Tennessee

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 1999, pp 379-396 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent-seeking contest. In civil litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the outcome of the contest. Institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart in other rent-seeking contests. The endogenous decision to participate in the rent-seeking contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case, and the decision by the defendant to defend it. The desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the parameter which describes the legal technology.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_22

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540792475

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_22

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().