A model of institutional formation within a rent seeking environment

Kevin Sylwester ()
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Kevin Sylwester: Southern Illinois University Carbondale

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2001, pp 459-466 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a game theoretic model in which some fraction of output is appropriated from entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are able to form a league to prevent this appropriation, but this might not be individually rational because of either the free rider problem or coordination failure. The model also shows that poorer countries are less able to form this league and so might not be able to develop institutions establishing property rights.

Keywords: Rent Seeking; Institutions; Property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_26

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_26

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