The open constitution and its enemies: Competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state

Oliver Volckart
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Oliver Volckart: Unit 1: International Economics

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2000, pp 527-543 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The article presents a simple non-mathematical model that helps to explain how states emerged in medieval and early modern Central Europe. Classical feudalism is modelled as an essentially state-less political system, that is, as a market for military security characterized by intensive competition. The emergence of states is interpreted as the consequence of rent seeking taking place in this market after the medieval growth of population and the simultaneous reduction in transaction costs changed the market power of the parties contracting for the supply of security.

Keywords: Constitutional history; State formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H4 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_30

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_30

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