Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking

Amihai Glazer ()
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Amihai Glazer: University of California

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2002, pp 649-656 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract An owner or other leader can more effectively obtain rents or other benefits for his organization the higher the quality of his staff. These staff may, however, also seek rents inside the firm, with the most able staff best able to do so. The paper finds that an employer will hire better staff the stiffer the competition for external rents, and the smaller the assets of the firm. The relation between the quality of an owner and the quality of his staff is not monotonic: both high-and low-ability owners may prefer staff of low ability.

Keywords: Owner; Rent seeking; Principal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_38

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_38

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