Vickrey Auctions for Railway Tracks

Ralf Borndörfer (), Annette Mura () and Thomas Schlechte ()
Additional contact information
Ralf Borndörfer: Konrad-Zuse-Zentrum für Informationstechnik Berlin
Annette Mura: Konrad-Zuse-Zentrum für Informationstechnik Berlin
Thomas Schlechte: Konrad-Zuse-Zentrum für Informationstechnik Berlin

Chapter 89 in Operations Research Proceedings 2008, 2009, pp 551-556 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We consider a single-shot second price auction for railway slots, the Vickrey Track Auction (VTA), in which the winner determination problem is a complex combinatorial optimization problem. We show that the VTA is incentive compatible, i.e., rational bidders are always motivated to bid their true valuation, and that it produces efficient allocations, even in the presence of constraints on allocations. The results carry over to \generalized" Vickrey auctions with combinatorial constraints

Keywords: Dominant Strategy; Bidding Strategy; Railway Track; Combinatorial Auction; Railway Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-00142-0_89

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642001420

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-00142-0_89

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().