The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in Public Listed Firms: An Overview

Ana Paula Matias Gama ()
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Ana Paula Matias Gama: University of Beira Interior, Portugal

A chapter in Corporate Governance, 2012, pp 59-87 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A key issue in corporate governance is whether large owners contribute to resolving agency problems or exacerbate them. This paper surveys how large shareholders interact among themselves and how the composition of the controlling group, as well as the type of shareholders, can affect both monitoring and the level of private benefit extraction and, consequently, firm value. Recent studies on ownership structure of listed firms reveal that family firms are the most common form of ownership. We therefore also analyse potential agency conflicts that can emerge between families and other large shareholders by examining the governance roles of the structures of multiple large shareholder.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Cash Flow; Firm Performance; Earning Management; Family Firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-31579-4_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_3

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