Game Analysis on Trade Diversion Effect of China’s Anti-dumping

Chundi Liu ()
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Chundi Liu: Shanghai University of Engineering Science

A chapter in LISS 2012, 2013, pp 995-998 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract With more and more foreign countries dump in Chinese market, it’s necessary for China to take the anti-dumping measures. However, the effect of China anti-dumping is very complex and most of domestic studies on China anti-dumping have been based on the active effect of China anti-dumping. Then, with foreign countries’ crazy dumping in Chinese market, shall we take the anti-dumping measures blindly? Whether the effect of China anti-dumping is surely positive and active? This article studies the trade diversion effect of China anti-dumping by means of the dynamic game model. It’s helpful for us to understand anti-dumping correctly and take the appropriate anti-dumping measures timely.

Keywords: Anti-dumping; Trade diversion effect; Game analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-32054-5_139

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32054-5_139

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