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Pricing Decision Analysis for Information Services of the Internet of Things Based on Stackelberg Game

Lijun Mei, Wei Li () and Kai Nie
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Lijun Mei: Hunan University
Wei Li: Hunan University
Kai Nie: Hunan University

A chapter in LISS 2012, 2013, pp 1097-1104 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In order to study the pricing of information service market in the Internet of Things, we construct a pricing model based on Stackelberg game by Intermediaries and information providers. On this basis, the optimal strategies of information service providers and Intermediaries are obtained by game theory. Then, according to the results of numerical simulation we draw the conclusions that if the price of intelligent terminal equipment is expensive, the information provider shall adopt pure bundling strategy, whereas take pure components strategy. While the variation of evaluation value for consumer information products becomes bigger, pure bundling strategy should be taken by the information service providers. When the information provider wants to adopt pure components strategy, then the variation of evaluation value for consumer information products should be satisfied by certain conditions.

Keywords: Internet of things; Pure components; Pure bundling; Information services pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-32054-5_155

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32054-5_155

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