Research on Revenue Sharing Contract in Retailer-Leading Supply Chain

Ying Qu (), Fang Wang () and Feng Liu ()
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Ying Qu: Hebei University of Science and Technology
Fang Wang: Beijing University of Technology
Feng Liu: The Central Institute for Correctional Police

A chapter in LISS 2012, 2013, pp 1285-1290 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the retailer-leading supply chain, the retailer is dominant over the manufacturer through announcing the sensitivity on his order quantity to the manufacturer’s wholesale price. The revenue sharing contract model are built. Then we analyze the decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer under the above contract model, and compare the wholesale price contract with the revenue sharing contract. Research results show that the revenue sharing contract can not coordinate the retailer-leading contract, and the retailer would rather to choose the wholesale price contract than the revenue sharing contract. Finally, the numerical simulation example testifies the truth of the analysis.

Keywords: Supply chain coordination; Wholesale price contract; Revenue sharing contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-32054-5_182

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32054-5_182

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