 An Analysis on Agricultural Insurance Subsidy Resource Allocation: A Principal-Agent PerspectiveShuxin Zhao ()
A chapter in LISS 2012, 2013, pp 1427-1433 from Springer Abstract: Abstract Agricultural insurance’s characteristics of high risk, high lost rate and high loss ratio as well as quasi-public goods properties determines its current difficult situation of long-term shortage in both supply and demand, which ensure the necessity of government support, i.e. financial subsidy. In this context, there is a principal-agent relationship between government and insurance companies or the insured farmers. Therefore, as principal, government must achieve proper contractual design in subsidy policy to avoid inefficiency, making full use of the motivation effect. In this paper, models based on the principal-agent theory are being used to build an analysis framework of policy design, addressing economic mechanism of government subsidy incentive policy, in the hope of offering answers to the question: how to allocate subsidies to expand supply and demand at the same time with limited government finance resources. Keywords: Agricultural insurance; Principal agent; Subsidy resource allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-32054-5_202 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32054-5_202 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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