Pricing and Coordination Research for TPL Based on Different Logistics Service Level

Xuehui He (), Wei Li () and Kai Nie
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Xuehui He: Hunan University
Wei Li: Hunan University
Kai Nie: Hunan University

A chapter in LISS 2012, 2013, pp 279-286 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we consider a situation that different logistics service level can influence the market demand, TPL service and the pricing decision models are constructed by using game theory. The equilibrium prices, service levels under different systematic states of two TPL enterprises are given. And the conclusion of this paper shows that the strong ability of logistics service does not necessarily have a competitive advantage when under the separate decision, pricing equilibrium under joint decisions not only make both sides get more income, but is also advantageous to raise the level of service. The conclusion also shows that revenue sharing is a good coordination mechanism for logistics service union, and its revenue sharing percentage depends on the negotiation skills of both sides.

Keywords: TPL; Service level; Service price; Revenue sharing; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-32054-5_42

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-32054-5_42

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