Evolutionary Analysis of Cooperative Behavior of the Countries in Cancun Climate Summit

Lei Zhao (), Guorong Chai (), Haizhou Wang and Guoping Li
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Lei Zhao: Lanzhou University
Guorong Chai: Lanzhou University
Haizhou Wang: Xi’an Jiaotong University
Guoping Li: Xi’an Jiaotong University

Chapter Chapter 136 in LTLGB 2012, 2013, pp 1027-1033 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Based on different interests and strategies, this paper divides related countries in Cancun summit into developed and developing camp and proposes symmetrical evolutionary model and asymmetric evolutionary model of cooperative behavior. Then it makes a duplicated analysis on the game theoretical model utilizing the evolutional game theory and studies its evolutionary path and impact factors. The results show that only the nations in the camps unite together can the favorable results appear; the more developing countries depend on the aid of developed countries, the more disadvantageous in the negotiation. Finally this paper analyzes the policy implications of research findings.

Keywords: Cancun summit; National camp; Cooperative behavior; Evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-34651-4_136

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-34651-4_136

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