Study of Land Price Game Equilibrium and Countermeasure Based on Combination Selling Style Regulation

Xia-Zhong Wang () and Wen-Dan Zhang
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Xia-Zhong Wang: Fuzhou University
Wen-Dan Zhang: Fuzhou University

Chapter Chapter 33 in Proceedings of the 17th International Symposium on Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate, 2014, pp 329-340 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Land as the important element of house has the huge influence of the house price. But the policy of local government and land nature trait result in the failure of land market and land value invalidation. So government should regulate the land price and let the price back to the rational level. This paper from the point of all kinds of interest sides gamed the land price. Analyze the land selling style and the elasticity of land price regulation to search the efficient price regulation in real estate market. In the ground of land market, government, local government and developer have the different utility and object which result there are three sides in the land game. And the Nash equilibrium indicates that central government should take optimized combination supply method to regulate the land price to stabilize the house price. And local government should apply with the policy of central government to realize the utility hypo-optimize. The game between local government and enterprise about the selling of land, only to take the combination Optimized land selling method and increase the weight of biding can reach the purpose of regulating the land price.

Keywords: Combination selling land; Land price game; Economic regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-35548-6_33

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35548-6_33

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