Institutional Investors and Corporate Short-Term Debt Financing

Fang-fei Ding, Chan Gu () and Jin-hua Chen
Additional contact information
Fang-fei Ding: University of Hunan
Chan Gu: University of Hunan
Jin-hua Chen: University of Hunan

Chapter Chapter 42 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 437-444 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract China’s listed companies have short-term debt financing preference. But institutional shareholders have the ability to influence the company’s financing decisions. Through the analysis of 2009–2011 data, we found that the proportion of institutional investors holding has a significant negative correlation with the level of short-term debt. The results show that institutional investors effectively participate in corporate finance. Institutional shareholders inhibit short-term debt financing preference. The positive action is conducive to the development of capital markets and the improvement of governance structure of listed companies.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Institutional investors; Short-term debt finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-37270-4_42

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642372704

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-37270-4_42

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().