Analysis of Environmental Governance for Construction Project Based on a Dynamic Non-cooperative Game

Jiao-jie Han () and Rui Zhao ()
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Jiao-jie Han: Southwest Jiaotong University
Rui Zhao: Southwest Jiaotong University

Chapter Chapter 45 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 467-477 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The model of extended producer’s responsibility (EPR) has been widely used for construction projects supervision. This paper mainly focuses on environmental governance based upon EPR model, from the perspective of game theory application. Moreover, a dynamic non-cooperative game theoretical model is built aimed at maximizing both economic and environmental benefits, in order to find out the main factors that may affect the producer’s effort level. This paper also provides theoretical support for the environmental management of construction project as well as aids to improve the exiting supervisory mechanism of environmental protection.

Keywords: Construction project; Dynamic non-cooperative game; Environmental governance; Extended producer responsibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-37270-4_45

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-37270-4_45

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