Research on Financial Accounting Information Disclosure of China’s Social Security Fund Based on Game Analysis

Sha-sha Dai (), Ke Pan and Yuan-yuan Dai
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Sha-sha Dai: Hunan University
Ke Pan: Bank of Communications Hunan Provincial Branch
Yuan-yuan Dai: Hunan University

Chapter Chapter 47 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 459-469 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Due to the non-consistency of the interests and objectives, confrontation and conflict will naturally occur between the accounting information providers of social security fund and regulators of the social security funds, and consequently the game will be generated. Applying the basic principles of game theory, the author firstly analyzes the mixed-strategy game between the social insurance fund management institutions and regulators; then conducts improvement and analysis on game model by regulatory measures like joining the civil regulatory and reporting; and finally concludes the relevant policy recommendations.

Keywords: Basic social security fund; Financial and accounting information; Information disclosed; Game analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38391-5_47

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38391-5_47

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