Study on the Dynamic Game Problem of Indemnificatory Apartment Construction Based on System Dynamics

Yong Li (), Ge Huang, Ya-qin Qu and Hui Xiong
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Yong Li: Changsha University
Ge Huang: Xiangtan University
Ya-qin Qu: Xiangtan University
Hui Xiong: Xiangtan University

Chapter Chapter 112 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 1065-1076 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes a dynamic game between the central and local governments in the construction of indemnificatory apartment. Some simulation models are established under system dynamics. Granted the game payoff, it is found that with the central government’s investment for the construction of indemnificatory apartment increased, if the incentive system and punishment measures of the central government are not clear, local governments will continue to reduce the amount of investment and tend not to invest. Finally, the paper presents some political suggestions on the central and local governments.

Keywords: Game playing; Indemnificatory apartment construction; System dynamics; The central and local governments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38427-1_112

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38427-1_112

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