Optimal Subsidy for Abatement R&D in Different Organizations with Emissions Tax

Wei-jun Meng () and Bin-yu He
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Wei-jun Meng: Chongqing Jiaotong University
Bin-yu He: Southwest University of Political Science and Law

Chapter Chapter 20 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 173-180 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract By the three-stage game model for duopoly with emission tax that is exogenous, we examine how the government makes optimal subsidy policy in consideration of duopoly’ organizations for abatement R&D. The results indicate: (1) with subsidy, social welfare in R&D cooperation is always higher than that in noncooperation; if the spillover of duopoly is relatively low the profit in cooperation is higher than that in noncooperation, if the spillover is relatively high the profit in cooperation is less; (2) with subsidy, if the spillover between duopoly is relatively low the duopoly prefer to choose cooperation in R&D, if the spillover is relatively high the duopoly prefer to choose non-cooperation in R&D. Different optimal subsidy policies shall be applied for R&D according to different organizations.

Keywords: Environmental research joint venture; Environmental R&D subsidies; Emissions tax; spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38427-1_20

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38427-1_20

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