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An Incentive Mechanism for Knowledge Sharing in Research Team

Huo-di Zhu (), Yan Liu and Bu-yu Xu
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Huo-di Zhu: ChongQing University of Technology
Yan Liu: ChongQing University of Technology
Bu-yu Xu: ChongQing University of Technology

Chapter Chapter 53 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 495-505 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper focuses on the incentive mechanism for knowledge sharing in Research team. The team is assumed to be constituted by two members (the first member and the second member). The team’s output is affected not only by the efforts of the first member (S1) and the second member (S2), but also by the core competitive knowledge of the second member (K2). Making use of game theory, we construct a multitasking model for team members’ inputs that analyzes three decision variables that influence team members’ knowledge sharing. And make a series of profound conclusions that related to team cooperation. These conclusions are important and instructive to research team building and team performance improvement.

Keywords: Game theory; Knowledge sharing; Mechanism design; Research team; Team performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38427-1_53

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38427-1_53

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