Research on the Optimal Supervision Level of Government in Highway Under PPP Model

Ying-hui Jian () and Dan Xu
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Ying-hui Jian: Hohai University
Dan Xu: Hohai University

Chapter Chapter 16 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 141-149 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract By game analysis of the public and private in PPP projects without the government supervision, the private enterprise will reduce the effort degree without the government supervision, then the public welfare in PPP projects must be reduced, which demonstrated the necessity of government supervision. And it is analyzed that the government supervision has effect on promoting the private enterprise to invest the PPP project according to the agreement, and solved the optimal investment level of government supervision. Finally, it built the supervision mechanism of the whole process of project to improve the efficiency of government supervision.

Keywords: Highway; Government supervision; Optimal PPP; Supervision level (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38433-2_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38433-2_16

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