Research on the Principal-Agent and Game Theory of Logistics Finance Oriented to the Financial Institution

Peng-fei Li, Li-jie Feng () and Yao-hui Li
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Peng-fei Li: Zhengzhou University
Li-jie Feng: Zhengzhou University
Yao-hui Li: Zhengzhou University

Chapter Chapter 18 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 175-182 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Logistics Finance don’t only bring new opportunities, but also more risks and challenges to the financial institutions. In the process of developing Logistics Finance, building and maintaining a good cooperative relationship with logistics companies is of extreme importance to financial institutions. In this paper, the principal-agent model and the game decision-making model between the financial institutions and logistics companies is established. And then, the factors which affect the behavior can be got through the two models. This paper aims at providing reference for decision making in the process of developing the Logistics Finance in order to promoting sustainable and healthy development of Logistics Finance.

Keywords: Financial institution; Game theory; Logistics finance; Principal-agent theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38442-4_18

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_18

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