Research on the Incentive Mechanism of the State-Owned Coal Enterprise Managers Based on the Principal-Agent Theory

Ai-yun Xing () and Guo-hui Wang
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Ai-yun Xing: Liaoning Technical University
Guo-hui Wang: Liaoning Technical University

Chapter Chapter 46 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 427-434 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Based on the Principal-Agent theory, combined with characteristics of China’s state-owned coal enterprise industry and the managers, through the introduction of manager capacity level, managers’ external degree of efforts and the output brought by uncertainty, established a principal-agent model, analyzing quantitatively and further discussing incentive problem of managers of the state-owned coal enterprise. At last, based on the actual situation, this article put forward the suggestion: establish a system for investors of state assets, establish long-term incentive mechanism, play the law supervision and restraint function, and establish and develop manager market and so on for the formulation and implementation of state-owned coal enterprise manager’s incentive strategy.

Keywords: Incentive; Principal-agent; State-owned coal enterprise managers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38442-4_46

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_46

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