Study on Limited Partnership Based on an Analysis of Incentive Mechanism Model of Venture Capitalist

Tian-jia Wang () and Ya-na Chen ()
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Tian-jia Wang: Wuhan University
Ya-na Chen: Wuhan University

Chapter Chapter 70 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 659-667 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the system of venture investment, there exists a kind of principal-agent relationship between the venture investor and venture capitalist, which will bring about a series of problems such as moral hazard. The organizational form of limited partnership is inclined to establish an incentive mechanism which can maximize the utility of both the venture investor and the venture capitalist with the coexistence of incentive and constraint. The paper establishes an incentive mechanism model in the organizational form of limited partnership and systematically discusses the effectiveness of the incentive pattern of limited partnership.

Keywords: Principal-agent relationship; Venture investor; Venture capitalist; Incentive mechanism model; Limited partnership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38442-4_70

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_70

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