Enterprise Compensation Incentive Theory on Principle-Agent Relation

Huo-bao Xie () and Chun-yan Chen
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Huo-bao Xie: University of Whuhan
Chun-yan Chen: University of Whuhan

Chapter Chapter 72 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 677-682 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper makes an analysis of the enterprise compensation incentive theories and documents their own advantages and shortcomings. From the perspective of principle-agent relationship, it put forward the opinion that tournament theory and behavior theory are suitable used in the relation between shareholders and managers, while piece-rate theory and time-rate theory are mainly applied in relation between managers and the front-line workers.

Keywords: Compensation; Incentive theory; Principle-agent relation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38442-4_72

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_72

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