The Optimal Bidding Strategies Research on Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Mechanism

Xiang-lin Pan () and Xu-hua Lv
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Xiang-lin Pan: Wuhan University of Science and Technology
Xu-hua Lv: Wuhan University of Science and Technology

A chapter in Proceedings of 2013 4th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI2013), 2014, pp 217-223 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we mainly study the multi-attribute reverse auction mechanism with multiple winners. By the multi-attribute utility theory and the probability theory, we build a multi-attribute procurement model, which is more in line with reality procurement environment, and then prove the supplier’s optimal bidding strategies. Moreover, we compare it with the first scoring model and conclude that, the optimal quality bidding strategies remain constant, while the optimal price bidding strategy increases with the number of the successful bidders.

Keywords: Multi-attribute; Multiple winners; Reverse auction; The optimal bidding strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-40060-5_21

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40060-5_21

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