Research on Knowledge Management Incentive in Collaborative Supply Chain with Reciprocal Preference

Xiao-lan He ()
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Xiao-lan He: Sichuan University

A chapter in Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 1175-1184 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Knowledge management is embraced in many organizations. This paper aimed to contribute to help the principal design a reasonable contract on the knowledge agent in collaborative supply chain. In order to compare, we planned two models, one was a normal principal-agent model with moral hazard, and the other was a model with reciprocal preference. The four tables showed the relationships between reciprocal preference and bonus, effort degree, fixed wage and the principal’s expected profit respectively. The four various all changed with reciprocal preference. Then the numerical experiment showed the principal should provide different contracts to the agent with different reciprocal preference. This paper provides support for reciprocal preference as an important factor in a collaborative supply chain based on knowledge management, and furthermore, it helps how the principal design a useful contract.

Keywords: Incentives; Knowledge management; Moral hazard; Reciprocal preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-40063-6_115

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40063-6_115

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