Analysis on Game of Service Outsourcing About Service Quality and Price Decision

You- de Dong and Qin-zhu Li ()
Additional contact information
You- de Dong: Shanghai University
Qin-zhu Li: Shanghai University

A chapter in Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 533-541 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Decision of quality and price causes a widespread attention because it affects the efficiency of service outsourcing. Firstly, this paper analyses the relationship of outsourcer and contractor in service outsourcing with Game Theory. Two models about service quality and price decision are established, one is Stackelberg dynamic game model which is based on individual decision-making of outsourcer and contractor, the other is a collaborative decision-making game model. Then, gross profit and optimal strategies about price and quality of Stackelberg dynamic game model are modified with two—stage backwards induction method. The optimal profit and strategies of collaborative decision-making game model are solved out by first-order optimization analysis. Finally, through comparing the optimal profits and strategies of these two models, the study finds out that customer demand and gross profit of the collaborative decision-making model are larger than those in individual decision-making while the service quality remains unchanged.

Keywords: Collaborative decision; Price decision; Service outsourcing; Service quality; Stackelberg game model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-40063-6_53

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642400636

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40063-6_53

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().