A Low Carbon Emission Regularity Between Companies and Supervisor Based on Evolutionary Analysis

Shi-liang Xia ()
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Shi-liang Xia: Hohai University

A chapter in Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 927-934 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Due to the severe warmer situation of environment, there resorts the common dream of the low carbon world. The construction of green low carbon society consists of all kinds of cooperation and regulation. The two most important players are companies and governmental sectors. This paper makes use of dynamics of evolutionary game theory according to economic rational suppose, after careful research of the double entity, we get the conclusion that the ideal equilibrium will appear only with the positive and the punishment mechanism.

Keywords: Evolutionary analysis; Low carbon emission; Limited rationality; Rationality of players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-40063-6_91

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40063-6_91

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