Promoting the Green Building Market: An Evolution Analysis and SD Simulation on Behaviors of Government and Real Estate Developers

Yisheng Liu (), Xiuli Xie () and Jing Hou ()
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Yisheng Liu: Beijing Jiaotong University
Xiuli Xie: Beijing Jiaotong University
Jing Hou: Beijing Jiaotong University

A chapter in LISS 2013, 2015, pp 877-883 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The Chinese government takes measures to promote the development of green building (GB). But the real estate developers are skeptical in entering GB market. In this study, we attempt Evolutionary game theory and System dynamics (SD) into the analysis. A system dynamics model is built for studying evolutionary games between the government and developers in greening building decision making. The results of mixed-strategy stability analysis and SD simulation show that evolutionary equilibrium does not exist with a static government incentive. Therefore, a dynamical incentive is suggested in the SD model for promoting the green building market. A symmetric game and an asymmetric game between two developers, in a competitive environment, are also analyzed in this paper.

Keywords: Green building; Evolutionary game; System dynamics; Real estate market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-40660-7_131

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40660-7_131

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