Interest Alignment Instruments of Shareholders

Frederik Drescher
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Frederik Drescher: TU München

Chapter 5 in Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making, 2014, pp 93-106 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The provision of special interest alignment instruments to ensure shareholder value–maximizing insolvency timing by an incumbent manager is subject to several requirements. These requirements derive from the previously outlined properties of the financial distress situation and can be grouped into the balance between regular and special interest alignment instruments, the decision complexity, and the legal implications of insolvency proceedings.

Keywords: Financial Distress; Employment Contract; External Advisor; Insolvency Proceeding; Bonus Payment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-658-02819-0_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-02819-0_5

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