The Rubinstein bargaining model

Harald Wiese ()
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Harald Wiese: Universität Leipzig

Chapter Chapter 16 in Advanced Microeconomics, 2021, pp 433-441 from Springer

Abstract: Zusammenfassung The aim of this very short chapter is to introduce the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model. It squarely belongs to non-cooperative game theory and can be seen as the obvious extension of the “take it or leave it” bargaining game in chapter X (pp. 271) and chapter XII (pp. 342) to a multi-period setting. The idea is that players can counter offers by counteroffers and counter-counteroffers.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-34959-2_16

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