Static Bayesian games

Harald Wiese ()
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Harald Wiese: Universität Leipzig

Chapter Chapter 17 in Advanced Microeconomics, 2021, pp 445-472 from Springer

Abstract: Zusammenfassung This chapter has several aims. On the methodological level, we consider static Bayesian games. We use them to shed some light on mixed strategies in strategic games, to introduce correlated equilibria, and to analyze the first-price auction. Finally, we present double auctions and the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem which argues that we cannot expect Pareto optimality in bargaining if both bargaining parties have imperfect information.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-658-34959-2_17

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-34959-2_17

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