The revelation principle and mechanism design

Harald Wiese ()
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Harald Wiese: Universität Leipzig

Chapter Chapter 18 in Advanced Microeconomics, 2021, pp 473-490 from Springer

Abstract: Zusammenfassung This chapter is a follow-up on the previous one. There, we were concerned with static Bayesian games. In these games, players learn their own types and they choose actions in dependence of their types.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-658-34959-2_18

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-34959-2_18

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