Stable Schedule Matching under Revealed Preference

A. Alkan () and D. Gale ()
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A. Alkan: Sabanci University
D. Gale: U. C.

A chapter in ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003, pp 3-19 from Springer

Abstract: Summary In a recent study Baiou and Balinski [3] generalized the notion of two-sided matching to that of schedule matching which determines not only what partnerships will form but also how much time the partners will spend together. In particular, it is assumed that each agent has a ranking of the agents on the other side of the market. In this paper we treat the scheduling problem using the more general preference structure introduced by Blair [5] and recently refined by Alkan [1, 2], which allows among other things for diversity to be a motivating factor in the choice of partners. The set of stable matchings for this model turns out to be a lattice with other interesting structural properties.

Keywords: Stable Matching; Two-sided Market; Lattice; Diversity; Schedule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-05219-8_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_1

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