On the Stability of Cooperation Structures

Guillaume Haeringer

A chapter in ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003, pp 167-183 from Springer

Abstract: Summary This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley potential of the link formation game, and establish its equivalence with the potential as defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [13]. We use this result to show that stable but Pareto dominated graphs can emerge under simple best-response dynamics.

Keywords: cooperation structure; graph; Myerson value; stability; potential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Working Paper: On the Stability of Cooperation Structures (2000)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_10

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