Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules

R. Brânzei (), F. Scotti (), S. Tijs () and A. Torre ()
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R. Brânzei: “Al. I. Cuza” University, Faculty of Computer Science
F. Scotti: Università di Pavia, Dipartimento di Matematica
S. Tijs: Tilburg University, CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research
A. Torre: Università di Pavia, Dipartimento di Matematica

A chapter in ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003, pp 281-286 from Springer

Abstract: Summary A canonical procedure is described which associates to each infinite information collecting situation a related information collecting situation with finite state and action spaces, in such a way that the two corresponding IC-games are near to each other. Compensations for informants are then shown to be also near to each other in the two IC-situations, provided that they are based on continuous compensation rules.

Keywords: Bi-monotonic allocation scheme; Cooperative game; Core; Discretization; Information collecting situation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-05219-8_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_16

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