Farsighted Stability in Duopoly Markets with Product Differentiation

Takeshi Masuda () and Shigeo Muto ()
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Takeshi Masuda: Tokyo Metropolitan University, Faculty of Economics
Shigeo Muto: Tokyo Institute of Technology, Graduate School of Decision Making and Technology, Department of Value and Decision Science

A chapter in ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003, pp 305-318 from Springer

Abstract: Summary Farsighted stability as proposed by Harsanyi and Chwe is examined in duopoly markets with product differentiation. Irrespective of competition style(Cournot or Bertrand) or irrespective of properties of goods(substitutes or complements) the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set gives a Pareto efficient and individually rational outcome. Moreover, the largest consistent set due to Chwe consists of all individually rational outcomes.

Keywords: game theory; farsighted stability; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set; largest consistent set; duopoly; product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-05219-8_19

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_19

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