Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with a Permission Structure

René van den Brink ()
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René van den Brink: Free University, Department of Econometrics

A chapter in ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003, pp 21-46 from Springer

Abstract: Summary A game with a permission structure describes a situation in a cooperative game with transferable utility in which cooperation possibilities are limited because some players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. In the conjunctive approach, it is assumed that every player needs permission from ail direct superiors. In the disjunctive approach, it is assumed that each player only needs permission from at least one direct superiors. Both approaches yield modified games which take account of limited cooperation possibilities. Applying the Banzhaf value to these modified games yields allocation rules that distribute the payoffs over the individual players. This paper provides axiomatic characterizations of these Banzhaf permission values.

Keywords: cooperative TU-game; Banzhaf value; directed graph; permission structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-05219-8_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_2

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