Endogenous Determination of Utility Functions: An Evolutionary Approach

Alexander A. Vasin ()
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Alexander A. Vasin: Moscow State University, Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics

A chapter in ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003, pp 75-88 from Springer

Abstract: Summary The assumptions on utility functions in economic models are questionable in many cases. The present paper studies whether it is possible to endogenize determination of payoff functions, and the mechanisms governing changes in the latter. The main conclusion is that “natural” payoff functions concern reproduction of individuals. We confirm this conclusion by known results on the Replicator Dynamics (RD). Another model shows that altruistic or cooperative behavior among relatives is evolutionarily stable if it maximizes the total fitness of the family. Finally, we discusses why the mentioned models in question do not apply to social populations, the mechanisms influencing individual behavior, and who or what changes individual utility functions.

Keywords: population dynamics; evolutionary games; optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-05219-8_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_4

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