N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma with Mutual Choice by Agent-based Modeling

Tomohisa Yamashita () and Azuma Ohuchi ()
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Tomohisa Yamashita: Hokkaido University, Graduate School of Engineering
Azuma Ohuchi: Hokkaido University, Graduate School of Engineering

A chapter in ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 2003, pp 89-106 from Springer

Abstract: Summary Recent research in economics, sociology, psychology and computer science has attampted to model partner selection in dilemma situation. Also, social interactions are often characterized by game partner choice. How do partner choice mechanisms influence the behaviors of players in N-IPD? To answer these questions, we proposed a N-IPD game with unilateral choice, mutual choice and extended mutual choice. Agent-based modeling in which an agent considered as a player with bounded rationality is applied to describe the N-IPD with partner choice mechanisms. As a result of agent-based simulations with an evolutionary approach, we confirmed that extended mutual choice or mutual choice with the rule on split of a group accelerates and maintains the emergence of collective cooperation in the N-IPD.

Keywords: Group Formation; Social Dilemma; Partner Choice; Dilemma Situation; Desirable Group (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-05219-8_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_5

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